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LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION POLICY: FROM NIRVANA
ANTITRUST POLICY TO REALITY-BASED INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETITION BUILDING
IGNACIO DE LEON, PH.D.*
Definitions do not yield any knowledge about the real world,
but they do influence impressions of the world.
-George J. Stiglerl
[T]he problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism adminis-
ters existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates
and destroys them. As long as this is not recognized, the investigator
does a meaningless job. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook on capi-
talist practice and its social results changes considerably.
-Joseph A. Schumpeter 2
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, several Latin American countries have adopted anti-
trust policies as part of their economic reform agenda.3 Often, the policies
have been based on an implicit assumption that they would have the bene-
ficial effect of promoting pro-market goals in the region.
Since its inception, however, advocates of antitrust policy in Latin
America have insisted on implementing the policies with little to no regard
Dr. Ignacio De Le6n previously served as the founder and President of Venezuela's Competi-
tion Authority, Pro-Competencia (1998-2000) and as counsel of the Venezuelan Foreign Trade Institute
(1990-1992). Dr. De Le6n received an LL.M. from Queen Mary College, and holds an M. Phil. and a
Ph.D. in Law from University College London. He is a professor in the Department of Economics at the
Universidad Cat6lica Andrrs Bello in Caracas, and is the Executive Director of EconLex Development
Strategies. He also serves as a member the Editorial Advisory Board of World Competition Law and
Economics Review.
1. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 94 (1988).
2. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d. ed. Harper
Torchbooks 1962) (1942).
3. Gheventer explores the possible links between economic liberalization and the introduction of
antitrust policy; in his view, there is a correlation between the intensity of pro-market reforms and
greater autonomy for the antitrust body. Alexandre Gheventer, Politica Antitruste e Credibilidade
Regulatrria na Am&ica Latina [Antitrust Policies and Regulatory Credibility in Latin America], 47
DADOs 335, 358 (2004) (Braz.), translated in 1 DADOS (SPECIAL EDITION) (2005), http://social-
sciences.scielo.org/pdf/sdados/v I nse/scs.a05.pdf.
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for the institutional setting for which they are intended.4 After more than a
decade of practical experience, it is time to make an institutional assess-
ment about the real effects of such policies in the region.
Assessing antitrust policy is not easy due to the lack of reliable em-
pirical research about its effects. 5 According to Hylton and Deng, the rea-
son for the scarcity of data lies in the lack of "useful statistical information
on the law, enforcement policies and penalties."' 6 In my view, however, the
failure to measure antitrust effectiveness lies instead in the lack of a
unanimously accepted normative yardstick to measure the success of the
policy. As we shall see in this article, the notion of competition used in
antitrust theory-that is, perfect competition-leads the analyst to make
misleading, normative conclusions about the causes and consequences of
business practices.
Conventional critiques of antitrust policy have avoided discussing
whether the policy stands on a firm intellectual foundation; instead, com-
mentators have engaged in a futile discussion about the particular ethical
goal the policy should seek (namely, efficiency or equity). Hence, analysts
of antitrust policy have been driven into a fruitless dispute about the com-
pleteness and accuracy of empirical evidence collected in support of their
preferred normative goal. 7
4. Kovacic notes: "In their enthusiasm for the adoption of antitrust laws in transition economies,
international donor groups such as the World Bank and individual Western countries have tended to
overlook grave problems that emerging markets have encountered in implementing the new statutes."
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust and Competition Policy in Transition Economies: A Preliminary Assess-
ment, 2000 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 513, 514.
5. From a quantitative perspective, there are few empirical studies on the effectiveness of anti-
trust policy in attaining its goals. For examples of such studies, see generally Arnold C. Harberger,
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1954); Richard A. Posner, A Statistical
Study ofAntitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of
the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1966); Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the
World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects (Boston Univ. Sch.
Of Law, Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-47, 2006); Michael W. Nichol-
son, Quantifying Antitrust Regimes (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 267, 2004).
6. Hylton & Deng, supra note 5, at 1.
7. Adams and Brock noted this in sarcastic terms:
Aficionados of the theatre of the absurd would find the character of the [antitrust] debate in-
timately familiar. There is an absence of communication-a terrifying diversity of utterances,
with the actors on stage listening only to snatches and fragments of the dialogue, and respond-
ing as if they had not listened at all. At times the dialogue consists of statements that are in
and of themselves perfectly lucid and logically constructed but lacking in context and rele-
vance. At other times, absurd ideas are proclaimed as if they were eternal truths. In this dia-
logue of the deaf, the actors are animated by the certitude and unshakeable nature of their
basic assumptions-one side relying on the wisdom of past experience, the other prepared to
sweep away the beliefs that have been tested and found wanting, beliefs they consider illu-
sions and self-deceptions.
WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS ON TRIAL: A DIALOGUE ON THE NEW
LAISSEZ-FAIRE, at xii (199 1) (citations omitted).
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In view of these empirical limitations, this paper argues that the source
of doubt about antitrust policy's effectiveness lies in the policy's internal
contradictions. To put it another way, the pursuit of perfect competition as
a normative goal leads antitrust policymaking into distorting, not reinforc-
ing, institutional arrangements that are necessary for markets to function.
To this extent, antitrust subverts competition rather than promoting it.
My focus in this paper will be different from the conventional discus-
sion of whether transitioning economies should endorse efficiency-oriented
competition policies (namely, consumer welfare) or some alternative goal.
Instead, I concentrate on how the perfect competition model, upon which
all antitrust theory rests, is beset with all sorts of limitations as a model of
market dynamics, and why any policy reference to it will undermine policy
analysis. In particular, I concentrate on how the model not only misreads
the informative role of those institutions necessary for markets to function,
but also--and more importantly-how it chastises these institutions as
"market imperfections" that policymakers should eliminate from the sys-
tem, if the system is to perform optimally.
The perfect competition model is the cornerstone of antitrust enforce-
ment. 8 The model supports the appraisal of markets carried out through
industrial organization, as well as normative precepts aimed at overcoming
perceived "market failures" arising from misallocation of resources caused
by anticompetitive business restrictions. Conventional market theory postu-
lates that perfectly competitive industries set prices equal to marginal costs;
therefore, they maximize consumers' rent. Under this theory, monopolies
are objectionable because the absence of competitors allows monopolists to
set prices above marginal costs. 9 From this perspective, it follows that anti-
trust policymakers assume their role should be to promote policies that
align markets closer to perfect competition and further from monopoly.
Alternative notions of economic competition employed in antitrust policy,
such as "effective competition" or "workable competition," are surrogate
forms that share the same conceptual criticisms as the perfect competition
model.
8. This model depicts a market structure featuring an infinite number of market participants
because: (i) entry and exit from the market is assumed to be free, so that any firms outside the industry
can move in at any time to take advantage of any above-normal profits; (ii) products are assumed
homogeneous, so there is no brand loyalty segmenting the market; (iii) no advertising is assumed to
exist; and (iv) all sellers and buyers are assumed to know all information. In other words, the model
conveys to the analyst a series of assumptions making up for the results expected from interactions
under such markets.
9. See generally MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39-55
(2004); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 2-5, 73 (MIT Press 2d ed. 1995) (1992).
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In this paper, I highlight the misleading normative treatment of market
institutions that the perfect competition model encapsulates. Indeed, the
perfect competition model leads analysts into condemning institutional
arrangements that are necessary for entrepreneurs to display their capabili-
ties-namely, to compete in the market place. I demonstrate that this model
is internally contradictory and, as a result, leads policymakers to flawed
conclusions.
This paper does not address the economic impact of the flawed policy
(as seen in the erosion of the rule of law it creates on the already weak
Latin American economic institutions), nor will it address the public choice
explanation (for example, that modem antitrust policy arises out of political
pressure from domestic industries that, in the wake of economic liberaliza-
tion, are unable or unwilling to compete with far more resourceful foreign
entrepreneurs). I therefore concentrate on the significant missing element
of conventional antitrust analysis which underlies the perfect competition
model: the role of economic expectations. Decisions are built upon beliefs;
hence, expectations are key to understanding how businesses make invest-
ment decisions in the real world. From there, I examine what sort of com-
petition policy should be implemented that will align with the alternative
theoretical view of competition proposed in this paper.
I. THE AFTERMATH OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
The introduction of antitrust policy in Latin America has been her-
alded as a mark of the new pro-market ethos brought about by economic
liberalization. As Ryan and Faden recently observed:
[T]he economic benefits of free competition are increasingly recognised
and the need for a strong and effective competition law to underpin a
competitive economy is now almost taken as a given. Thus many Latin
American countries are dedicating increasing government resources,
both human and financial, to establishing or developing antitrust laws
and policy.10
The ultimate purpose of economic liberalization in transitioning and
developing countries is promoting entrepreneurial creativity, innovation,
and economic growth, all of which were stifled during previous decades of
burdensome regulations, trade protectionism, and government dirigisme.'l
Consequently, policymaking should be judged by how effective the poli-
10. Alan Ryan & Karine Faden, Managing Antitrust in Latin America, 2007 GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV. (SPECIAL REPORT: THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2007) 61, 62.
11. Norberg provides an excellent empirical account of the welfare benefits accompanying trade
and institutional reforms. See JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 114-20 (Roger
Tanner & Julian Sanchez trans., Cato Institute 2003) (2001).
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cies are at fostering these goals. As this paper will show, antitrust policy
cannot do the job because its underlying logic necessarily results in en-
forcement decisions that prevent achievement of these goals.
From the economic point of view, under the postulates of the perfect
competition model competitive equilibrium leads to an optimal allocation
of social resources. 12 Regardless of whether such an allocation seeks Pareto
efficiency or some alternative goal, such as the protection of small firms, it
entails a departure from the spontaneous market outcomes that would occur
without interference. Thus, it is necessary to appraise the logic of antitrust
policy more closely before endorsing the conventional belief-that antitrust
policy will eradicate economic government dirigisme and consolidate pro-
market habits among otherwise anticompetitively-biased businesses. 13 An-
titrust policy advocates may have a misconception about the particular
nature of markets and the role of entrepreneurs, which could distort (and
possibly delay) both genuine initiatives aimed at introducing new markets
in Latin America and the real purposes behind antitrust policies. 14
There is a clear risk that antitrust enforcement could reintroduce dis-
carded government interventionist policies, albeit in a disguised fashion.
Consider, for example, a decision to penalize a business for entering into an
exclusive distribution contract that is allegedly an abusive or monopolistic
attempt to foreclose market access to a downstream competitor. Such pen-
alties represent administrative charges that businesses have to compute as
unexpected production costs that undermine their competitiveness. There is
no question that pre-merger control, as well as market surveillance that
protects against restrictive anticompetitive arrangements and that chal-
lenges "excessive," "monopolistic," or "unfair" prices, or prosecutes un-
popular dominant firms, has much in common with the old-style
12. Optimal efficiency in the allocation of resources, along with a state of equilibrium, would
prevail in markets under perfect competition. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 29-40 (Ist
paperback ed. 1988); Cento G. Veljanovski, Wealth Maximization, Law and Ethics-On the Limits of
Economic Efficiency, I INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 20 (1981). Under these conditions, market forces
would allocate social resources amongst individuals where they would obtain their maximum value.
Veljanovski, supra, at 20. The whole purpose of allocating such resources where their economic value
is highest is to benefit consumer welfare. See SEN, supra.
13. Consider, for example, the following statement made in reference to the rationale of antitrust
policy in Central and Eastern European countries: "The competition policy conducted by CIS Govern-
ments is directed at ensuring conditions for effective functioning of markets and promoting private
initiative. The appropriate regulatory bodies created in CIS countries exercise State antimonopoly
control and promote the development of market relations on the basis of effective competition and
entrepreneurship." U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Competition Policy in
Countries in Transition-Legal Basis and Practical Experience, 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITCD/CLP/Misc. 16 (2000) (prepared by Natalya Yacheistova).
14. See generally THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart II, eds., 1995).
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
government dirigisme. In this respect, Rajapatirana provides us with an
interesting study on the effects of trade liberalization policies in several
Latin American countries. She shows how the effectiveness of these poli-
cies has been limited by the reintroduction of many trade restrictions under
new forms and disguises. 15 My hypothesis is that antitrust policy is one
example of such disguised restrictions.
To be sure, my argument is not that competition policy is altogether
unnecessary or harmful. Rather, I argue that the meaning of competition is
open to alternative economic interpretations, and that such alternatives
should define alternative policymaking routes. In my view, the conven-
tional wisdom surrounding notions of competition has framed a sort of
policymaking that undermines, rather than reinforces, market mechanisms.
To this extent, antitrust policy principles are often oriented toward resur-
recting old government customs, which consist of rearranging market out-
comes, condemning certain market prices on considerations of fairness, and
judging whether certain levels of output are "socially convenient" (or opti-
mally efficient). If anything, this is a renewed form of government dirig-
isme, rather than a policy to promote effective competition and
entrepreneurship.
Rather than being concerned about opening spaces for entrepreneurs
to display their talent and creativity, the investigative activity of antitrust
agencies usually centers around measuring market size in order to ascertain
the proper market share of each market participant and to see if any particu-
lar participant's share is extremely large. Moreover, antitrust agencies typi-
cally assess the optimal levels of market concentration, establish the proper
degree of contestability in suspect industries, count the appropriate number
of firms, measure the right size of the relevant market, and undertake simi-
lar structural endeavors. 16
15. The study to which I refer, which was conducted in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica,
Uruguay and Trinidad, gives a School of Public Choice-based explanation for the reasons that these
countries slowed the pace of trade reform in different areas and levels of economic activity. The conclu-
sions highlight the real problems that the promotion of competition faces in the region. In particular,
Rajapatirana argues that "despite [trade] liberalizations, some sectors have continued to receive protec-
tion.... [and] there have been attempts to introduce measures to provide relief to activities which have
been subject to increased competition from imports, on the grounds of [unfair] trade practices." Sarath
Rajapatirana, Post Trade Liberalization Policy and Institutional Challenges in Latin America and the
Caribbean 17-18 (The World Bank Latin America and the Caribbean Technical Dep't Advisory Group,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1465, 1995). Although the study explains the Latin American rent-
seeking behavior in the field of international trade, its conclusions can be easily extended beyond, to
trade in general.
16. To show this, one only needs to look at the items evaluated under the U.S. Merger Guidelines,
which outline the standard analysis employed internationally to evaluate merger operations. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev. ed. 1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
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Notably, none of the guidelines used by antitrust agencies to evaluate
whether anticompetitive restraints exist give priority to the innovation of
market participants or the intensity of innovation in the industry as a whole.
Antitrust scholars' views of these arrangements appear biased inasmuch as
they assume that market participants bear some "natural" monopolistic
tendencies.
Hence, instead of analyzing competition from the idealized assump-
tion that markets fail to achieve the idealized standard of perfect competi-
tion, I propose quite the opposite: due to its reliance on idealized market
models that utterly disregard the institutional surrounding where market
action takes place, antitrust analysis is inherently biased against any form
of market arrangement entailing business coordination (which is viewed as
an expression of monopolistic intent). Our problem, then, is not located at
the empirical level, but higher, at the epistemological level: we need to
explore the way the antitrust mindset operates and its conceptual linita-
tions.
In my opinion, the implicit bias in antitrust thinking stems from a par-
ticular understanding of the world--one that misinterprets the arrange-
ments entered into by entrepreneurs in order to solve their lack of certainty
about the institutional environment where they must invest. Therefore, a
wholesale reappraisal of markets and regulation, which conventional epis-
temology is unable to deliver, may be necessary before endorsing the opti-
mism of regulatory reform in Latin America.
II. NIRVANA ANTITRUST POLICYMAKING
At the theoretical level, the lure of economic efficiency is rooted in
policymakers' quest to achieve utopian social welfare through targeted
intervention. This idea stems from the assumption that policymakers can
attain a complete picture of the underlying forces that shape social reality
and regulate them to attain optimal social welfare. 17
17. See generally I F.A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK (W.W. Bartley III ed., press ed. 1989); In the field of economic science, see
Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 641-42 (1980). Policymakers
generally acknowledge that this goal is unattainable; hence, they make do with attaining second best
objectives, namely, to merely improve market performance by intervening and eliminating market
failures. On the theory of second-best, see David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, Regulating a Monopo-
list with Unknown Costs, 50 ECONOMETRICA 911 (1982). Rey critiques the second-best theory as
applied in the field of antitrust. See Patrick Rey, Director of the Industrial Economic Institute, Univer-
sity of Toulouse, Antitrust Policy, Comments at the Economics for an Imperfect World Conference
(Oct. 24, 2003), transcript available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/festschrift/Papers
/Stig-Rey.pdf.
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This nirvana mindset reproduces in the realm of economic policy
what, in social sciences, Epstein has termed "perfect justice." 18 As a goal of
policymaking, perfect justice requires rooting out error in every case, re-
gardless of the costs.19 Similarly, Sowell refers to "cosmic justice," or jus-
tice that is cost-free, and takes into account the particular welfare position
of each individual in society so as to level his or her condition to that of the
rest.20 Sowell criticizes this endeavor on the grounds that it is impossible to
devise an ideal standard of equality that would satisfy the individual condi-
tion of everyone, given the costs involved in such efforts. Thus, "[w]ith
justice, as with equality, the question is not whether more is better, but
whether it is better at all costs. '21
Similar concerns arise in antitrust policymaking. Those who support
economic efficiency and consumer welfare base their views on the welfare
properties of the perfect competition model: if the model embodies optimal
competitive equilibrium, it follows that policy initiatives should aim to
achieve such a state. This is why such thinking has been branded as a "nir-
vana" mindset: if one takes into account the costs of attaining such optimal-
ity, it becomes clear that no such optimal state really exists.22
In the 1940s, Clark noted:
[T]he conception of "perfect competition" has itself for the first time re-
ceived really specific definition and elaboration. With this has come the
realization [sic] that "perfect competition" does not and cannot exist and
has presumably never existed .... Wat we have left is an unreal or
ideal standard which may serve as a starting point of analysis and a
norm with which to compare actual competitive conditions. It has also
served as a standard by which to judge them.23
Indeed, the perfect competition model has been used extensively to
develop antitrust policy prescriptions. 24 In the 1970s, Hayek indicated with
18. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 38 (1995).
19. Id.
20. THOMAS SOWELL, THE QUEST FOR COSMIC JUSTICE 12 (1999).
21. Id. at 27.
22. Harold Demsetz referred to this as the "nirvana fallacy," which is the intellectual error of
considering the possibility of perfection, but ignoring how hard it is for the authority to obtain the
necessary information to accomplish it. The tendency of anyone falling within this intellectual error is
to consider his neighbor's garden always greener. Thus, compared to nirvana, reality always appears
full of "market failures." See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 1-3 (1969).
23. J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241, 241 (1940)
(emphasis added).
24. The use of surrogate models such as the workable or effective competition model does not
invalidate this conclusion. These models are grounded on the assumption that the perfect competition
model cannot be found in "reality"; yet, the epistemological flaws invalidating the latter also apply to
the former. Thus, like the perfect competition model, the effective competition model also endorses the
mistaken welfare duality between perfect competition and pure monopoly.
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regard to the perfect competition model that this "ideal case ... came to be
regarded as the model and was used as a standard by which the achieve-
ment of competition in the real world was judged. ' 25 More recently, Klein
confirmed the importance of the perfect competition model for antitrust
purposes by indicating that of all the various analytical toolkits that consti-
tute contemporary political economy, "[p]erhaps the most important model
for economists is the model of perfect competition. '26
Naturally, by comparison with optimal idealized perfect competition,
real world businesses are subject to a permanent state of failure. As Nobel
Prize laureate Stigler commented:
If only markets with a vast number of traders are perfectly competitive,
and if markets with few traders are called oligopolistic (literally, "few
sellers"), that suggests that these latter markets are not competitive, as
well as not perfectly competitive .... This suspicion of small numbers
was gradually reinforced by the antitrust cases.27
It is no coincidence that Oskar Lange, the most renowned economist
to advocate economic socialism, shared the same contempt as antitrust
regulators over non-perfect competition markets due to their less-than-
optimal allocation properties. 28 Indeed, his conclusion was inescapable:
since perfect competition can only be found in the imagery of the ideal
world of equilibrium, the capitalist system is, by definition, a less desirable
choice than economic socialism. 29
25. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE 66 (1979).
26. Benjamin Klein, The Use of Economics in Anti-trust Litigation: Realistic Models of the Com-
petitive Process, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION POLICY 420 (Frank Mathewson et al.
eds., 1990).
27. STIGLER, supra note 1, at 94.
28. See OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM 106-07
(Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., 1964).
29. In Lange's words:
The possibility of determining the distribution of incomes so as to maximize social welfare
and of taking all the alternatives into the economic account makes a socialist economy, from
the economist's point of view, superior to a competitive regime with private ownership of the
means of production and with private enterprise, but especially superior to a competitive capi-
talist economy where a large part of the participants in the economic system are deprived of
any property of productive resources other than their labor. However, the actual capitalist sys-
tem is not one of perfect competition; it is one where oligopoly and monopolistic competition
prevail. This adds a much more powerful argument to the economist's case for socialism. The
wastes of monopolistic competition have received so much attention in recent theoretical lit-
erature that there is no need to repeat the argument here. The capitalist system is far removed
from the model of a competitive economy as elaborated by economic theory. And even if it
conformed to it, it would be, as we have seen, far from maximizing social welfare. Only a so-
cialist economy can fully satisfy the claim made by many economists with regard to the
achievements of free competition.
Id. Of course, Lange assumed that in operational terms such a goal could only be achieved by national-
izing production and giving orders to public officials in charge of running state-owned enterprises. In
the absence of extreme government intervention, there is no question that he would have seen antitrust
20081
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In conclusion, antitrust policy is conceived in terms of nirvana think-
ing to the extent it employs the ideal perfect competition model as a norma-
tive reference for implementing policy recommendations. This policy, also
known as "competition policy" in Europe and Latin America, is a govern-
ment instrument designed to intervene in markets in order to preserve ri-
valry among independent buyers and sellers in relatively unregulated
markets. In other words, antitrust intervention is driven by the need to cor-
rect perceived market failures; the role of the authority is primarily to chal-
lenge the business conduct that causes such failures. Antitrust enforcement
focuses on preserving "independent" business decision-making, and con-
trolling the potential sources of market foreclosure that would otherwise
limit the effective number of business operators. 30 In sum, antitrust think-
ing is grounded on the belief that industrial concentration is bad for compe-
tition-but where does that conviction come from?
III. MATHEMATICAL SIMPLIFICATION TRIGGERS AN ILLUSION
The nirvana approach is flawed due to its contrived view of market
dynamics. But even more significant than its rejection of any trace of real-
ism are its fundamental contradictions, which deserve further attention.
Under the nirvana approach, the underlying assumption is that the per-
fectly competitive firm is so small relative to the overall market that it can-
not influence the market's course: its impact is negligible or, as economists
usually put it, infinitesimally small. Under this logic, naturally, each firm
has to behave as a price taker, in the sense that it cannot decide unilaterally
what price consumers will pay. Thus, the perfect competition market will
be the polar opposite of a pure monopoly market where, through output
restrictions, firms unilaterally dictate the terms under which consumers will
pay higher prices. This is possible because monopoly firms face a nega-
tively sloped demand curve, so that prices exceed marginal revenues (P >
policy as a perfectly logical device to achieve the socialist allocation goals that he advocated, by prose-
cuting firms unwilling or incapable of behaving as social welfare dictates. Clearly, from a policy view-
point the underlying logic is similar in both cases: governments must intervene in order to achieve
optimal resource allocation because the market is plagued by market failures, such as those arising from
monopolistic competition.
30. See Roger A. Boner & Reinald Krueger, The Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review of Ten
Nations and the European Communities 2-5, 92-93 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 160, 1991). This
policy is also referred to as "antitrust policy" because it focuses on the ills of economic concentration
arising from the collective action of trusts and cartels. Id. at 1. Hence, it condemns any business conduct
that aligns competitors and any unilateral behavior that excludes or raises impediments to prevent third
parties from joining the market; it strives to control mergers and acquisitions; it focuses on mechanical
measurements of market size, based on the cross-elasticity of demand; and it views market power
structurally. Id. at 1-5.
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Mr). Under these conditions, monopoly firms will be able to set prices
above the ideal point where consumers would otherwise maximize their
income.
In perfect competition, by contrast, no such wealth transfer happens.
In such markets prices equal marginal revenues and these are equal to mar-
ginal production costs (P = Mr = Me); therefore, firms must yield to the
price set by the market. Such prices force firms to produce efficiently so
that their marginal revenues will equal their marginal costs (M, = Mc), oth-
erwise they will be expelled from the market (by going out of business).
This is why, on paper, perfect competition appears desirable whereas a
monopoly does not. The implicit assumption is that, due to their infinitesi-
mal market share, firms placed in perfectly competitive situations must take
whatever price they are offered in the market; the effect of their business
decisions is therefore negligible.
Naturally, the welfare implications of such polar ends (monopoly ver-
sus perfect competition) rest on the assumption that such duality does exist;
in particular, they rest on the assumption that at the market price perfectly
competitive firms face individual flat demand curves, as displayed in the
sequence of Figures 1-4, below:
ToWi Deimand TOWI Dellalid
In 
l 
Demand 
T 
IWn 
l
Ind idlua Demand
$30 $30
100 Q so 100 Q
Figure I Figure 2
Individual demand of a monopoly firm Individual demand of a duopoly
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TO3 Demand
$30 3 f r
3333 100 100 7
Figure 4
Figure 3 Individual demand under perfect
Individual demand of an competition
oligopoly
But are individual demand curves ever really flat?
As the conventional theory postulates, perfectly competitive firms are
so small that they do not change their output in response to a change in
output by other firms. Therefore, if a single firm happens to increase its
output by one unit, the total industry output should also increase by one
unit, since other firms will not react. Thus, under the terms of the perfect
competition model, individual demand curves can never truly be flat, be-
cause an increase in the supply of one firm increases the total market out-
put, causing market prices to fall. The only way individual demand curves
could be flat would be if, in the event that one firm increases its supply, all
other firms reduced their output by that same amount. Only then would the
market supply curve and the price remain constant.
In other words, the two assumptions underlying the perfect competi-
tion model are mutually inconsistent: either firms operating in such markets
do not face flat demand curves (for the price would then fall, even infini-
tesimally, in the event of an output increase by another market participant),
or prices do not fall in the event of an output increase. Naturally, the latter
choice would deny that individuals operating in perfect competition mar-
kets act under the same logic of economic behavior that applies to other
markets. Hence, we are forced to conclude that the only viable choice is
assuming that flat demand curves are as real as unicorns; that is, they exist
only in fantasy. Indeed, the perfect competition model assumes that firms
do not react to each other's behavior, yet experience and common sense
demonstrate this is exactly what businesses do in the real world.
Consider the position faced by a firm such as PepsiCo in the soft drink
market. PepsiCo must be as attentive to its competitors' moves as it is to its
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customers' demands. It must see how Coca-Cola and other competitors
perform in the market, what new products they advertise, what control they
hold over their distribution networks, what productive capacity they have,
how easily they can reach new and existing markets, what level of confi-
dence Coca-Cola's consumers have in Coca-Cola's products, and so forth.
As this simple example demonstrates, firms do not act in isolation; rather,
they place themselves in a strategic setting, where they make investment
decisions after taking into consideration the simultaneous moves of their
competitors, suppliers, clients, and customers. From one perspective, these
are indeed competitive moves, as they are intended to challenge competi-
tors in the market, but from another perspective, they also can be regarded
as coordinative strategies aimed at avoiding overproduction.
The real economic problem of interacting firms in the market is, then,
how do they coordinate their activities in the event of a single firm's deci-
sion to change its output? This is not to pretend that coordination does not
exist (or that it has been already understood and "worked out" by other
firms). We shall come back to the fundamental problem of how economic
agents develop their expectations about the conduct of other firms later.
The problem I want to emphasize at this point is simply that the perfect
competition model is not only unreal, in the sense that it does not consider
this aspect of real-life markets, but also that it is internally flawed, since it
is based on two mutually inconsistent assumptions: on one hand, it postu-
lates that an increase in the supply by one firm would increase the total
market output while the individual demand faced by perfect competitors
would remain flat, yet at the same time it contends that prices would fall in
the event of a market output increase-a situation in which total demand,
no matter how little, would decrease instead of remaining the same.
In short, the demand curve faced by individual firms can never be flat;
instead, it is infinitesimally sloped. Mathematically speaking, infinitesimal
is not equal to zero. The addition of infinitesimally negative sloped indi-
vidual demand curves will result in a negative sloped collective (namely,
industry-wide) demand curve. Conversely, if the assumptions of the perfect
competition model were true (namely, the slope of an individual demand
curve is zero), then the addition of such curves would mathematically result
in an industry demand curve with a zero slope. Therefore, the alleged dis-
tinction between firms operating in perfect competition markets and those
operating in non-perfect competition markets is untenable. All firms will
mark their prices at a level which is above the point where marginal reve-
nues and marginal costs are equal. In other words, all firms will behave as
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monopolists, even if in highly decentralized markets they will do so on an
infinitesimally small scale.
It is evident that the drafters of the perfect competition model tried to
simplify reality in order to isolate and better examine the market's constitu-
tive forces, but in doing so they created a virtual reality that distorted the
forces the analysis was intended to examine. Virtual reality embedded in
economic models is useful only insofar as long as it preserves those essen-
tial traits of the phenomenon that it purports to analyze. 31 The question is
whether the perfect competition model does so. The answer is obviously
negative. By assuming that under perfect competition individual firms face
flat demand curves, and that firms would become price takers no matter the
increase in total output, the drafters of this model took away the most im-
portant trait of competition as we know it: the obvious fact that firms do
not act in isolation, but take into account what other firms do in the market
where they compete. No individual firm would increase its own output
without paying due regard to the expected conduct of other firms. Coordi-
nation of expectations becomes the key economic problem to be addressed.
Although the coordination problem of economic transactions was
identified and discussed by Hayek in 1937,32 it was not until Richardson's
work in 1960 that the contradictions of the perfect competition model were
laid bare. 33
Richardson noted that the very assumptions of the perfect competition
model, summarized in the idea of "perfect knowledge," were inherently
contradictory. 34 The assumption of perfect knowledge (namely, that knowl-
edge is evenly shared by everyone in the market) denies individuals any
chance of reaching the perfect competition state. Why? Because if the
knowledge needed for individuals to attain perfect competition is equally
and perfectly shared by all individuals in the market, then no one would be
able to seize the profit opportunity:
A general profit opportunity, which is both known to everyone, and
equally capable of being exploited by everyone, is, in an important sense,
31. Popper contended that it is impossible to verify the perfect competition model, given that
models are metaphysical statements. If this is the case, then we will have to accept the implications of
the model as a matter of logical deduction and admit that the world may reach a state of perfect compe-
tition. In this case, though, it is crucial for the model to replicate the world. However, this is not simple;
models in economics are merely tools for expressing certain relationships in mathematical terms. Real-
ity, as Popper has indicated, is a non-verifiable issue-and, therefore, beyond the realm of science. See
David Papineau, Philosophy of Science, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 291-93
(Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui-James eds., 1996).
32. See F. A. von Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4 ECONOMICA 33 (1937).
33. G.B. RICHARDSON, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT 1-2, 36-38 (1960).
34. Id. at 36-38.
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a profit opportunity for no-one in particular; it will create the incentive to
invest only provided some people are less able to discern it, or to respond
to it, than others.35
So the perfect competition model creates an illusion of business be-
havior that is never real, for all firms-even those whose influence on price
is infinitesimal-behave as monopolists. In other words, there is no distinc-
tion between the welfare effects of these firms and those who command
large chunks of the market. All firms price their goods above marginal
costs in order to obtain profits.
Two questions follow, then: First, what remains of the antitrust admo-
nition against firms who happen to operate in non-perfectly competitive
markets? Second, given the lack of theoretical support for contemporary
antitrust policy, what are the available alternatives? In other words, how
should competition policymaking be redrafted in order to more accurately
take into account how firms behave in the real world? Let us address these
two problems in turn.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FOLLOWING PERFECT COMPETITION'S NORMATIVE
INNUENDO
Having demonstrated that the perfect competition model is inherently
flawed, what happens if we nevertheless insist on imposing perfect compe-
tition standards upon real-world firms? To put it differently, what is wrong
with judging real life situations under ideal standards of "perfection"? Let
us see how firms operating at perfect competition would fare if we dropped
the assumption that they confront a flat demand curve. Let us see how they
fare if, as we have already established, they do operate in markets where P
> Mr.
Again, perfect competition assumes that M, = Mr = P. Individually,
perfectly competitive firms produce a level of output that maximizes their
profit; but collectively such firms produce at a loss, because they will be
forced to sell at a price where P = Me, which is lower than the price that
would maximize their profits (M, = Mr). Such loss arises from the costs of
firms acting without coordination between them. By forcing them to act
independently, perfectly competitive firms will be unable to seize profits
from market opportunities. These profits would accrue only at the point
where prices paid by the market actually exceed marginal cost. Instead,
perfectly competitive firms will undercut their competitors by forcing them
into a price war, which will force them to sell a higher level of output at the
35. Id. at 57.
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point where supply (marginal cost) and demand (price) intersect-but from
the viewpoint of the individual firm (under our realistic assumption that P >
Mr), that will yield collective losses for everyone.
To see this more clearly consider Figure 5:36
Figure 5
Monopoly profits vs. Perfect Competition losses
As this figure shows, by forcing firms to charge perfect competition
prices at point B, where total supply (the sum of Mc) and total demand
intersect, the firms individually obtain lower profits than they would if they
charged monopoly prices, or prices above marginal revenues (C'- B'). At
point A, firms would maximize their profits; past this point, their profits
would diminish. Clearly, the addition of losses would lead everyone in the
market to a loss (assuming, of course, perfect information).
36. This figure was adapted with permission from STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS: THE
NAKED EMPEROR OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 95 fig.4.5 (2001).
[Vol 83:1
FROM NIRVANA TO REALITY
As Keen explains, firms in perfect competition would face a loss be-
cause in these markets, marginal costs exceeds marginal revenue, unlike
monopoly markets where the opposite is true.37 The only possible explana-
tion for profit-maximizing, where perfectly competitive firms produce at a
higher level of output and lower price, is that they are irrational. The only
possible way of making a profit is to collectively coordinate their actions in
such a way as to avoid losses.
In short, antitrust policy enforcement brings about market losses, as it
forces individual firms to sustain individual losses on the false assumption
that under perfect competition, they would produce optimally. Antitrust
policy thus ignores that, in the real world, firms need to collectively avoid
losses (such as costs) that would otherwise impede them from attaining
optimal results. These losses would be avoided through collective coordi-
nation.
Policymaking needs to address practical questions faced by flesh-and-
bone individuals in their ordinary transactions. In order to do so, it needs to
rest on sound economic theory. The perfect competition model is a futile
imaginary device that does not explain how markets achieve optimality,
except by postulating that the information of the system is already known
to economic agents-before it has, in fact, passed to them. To put it differ-
ently, it assumes that collective coordination among economic agents has
already occurred without telling us how. Yet knowing how economic
agents coordinate their actions is precisely the key to achieving the opti-
mality it seeks: to this extent, the model is totally hapless. The perfect
competition model cannot explain this, because it rests on the flawed as-
sumption that firms would maximize their profits individually without be-
ing affected by what other firms do in the market; the optimal production
level is attained without considering the collective market outcome. For if,
along with economic theory, we assume that economic agents are profit-
maximizers, there is no reason to expect that, collectively, they would be
willing to take losses.
For this reason, analysts end up twisting the motives of market par-
ticipants. By taking perfect competition as the ideal of how markets should
function, policymakers misleadingly look to uneven information coordina-
tion such as the "failures" or "costs" of the economic system that enlight-
ened policymaking can easily spot and eliminate. Loasby observes in this
connection:
37. Id. at 99.
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[The competitive equilibrium] program produces misleading prescrip-
tions for policy. Those prescriptions are derived from the study of a sys-
tem that is fully adjusted [i.e., perfectly competitive markets] to existing
data and in which there is no expectation that these data could ever
change: thus any elements that might be necessary to recognize and re-
spond to change are strictly superfluous. Once everything is agreed-and
within the analytical convention, finally agreed-there is no further need
for any of the apparatus of enquiry, communication, and control which
might have been required to secure agreement. It is all to be condemned
as [according to taste] organizational slack, x-inefficiency, wastes of
competition, or monopolistic misallocation. There is not even any reason
for the existence of firms. 38
In the real world, where equilibrium is not gained by mere analytical
postulation but through coordinative actions undertaken by entrepreneurs
who lack knowledge about their optimal course of action, these so-called
"failures" are in fact essential institutional means whereby they can obtain
the necessary knowledge to induce them into action. In other words, these
institutional "failures"-from the conventional antitrust viewpoint-are in
fact necessary in order to coordinate the market system at all.
Richardson noted the pervasive effect of this model in the construction
of a mindset for market analysis:
[The perfect competition model] undoubtedly stood, for many people, as
an ideal or model form of organization-strictly speaking only a logical
as opposed to an ethical ideal, although this distinction was not always
sharply made. It does not seem to have been recognized that the fact that
'imperfections', in some forms and degree of strength, are clearly an ob-
stacle to adjustment, does not entitle one to conclude that it would be
best if [market] 'imperfections' were absent altogether. Yet the peda-
gogic convenience of perfect competition, and its suitability as a base for
extensive formal and mathematical elaboration, gave the system a central
place in theoretical discussion .... 39
In order to adapt to the conduct of rational firms whose actions are
dictated by the premise that prices exceed marginal costs (P > Mc), it is
necessary for us to reconsider the notion of competition built upon the false
duality of two extreme and idealized market structures, between which
firms presumably would command some degree of market power. Further,
in order to restate the notion of economic competition, we must focus our
attention on the problem of collective knowledge, where finrs must coor-
dinate in order to avoid losses.
38. Brian J. Loasby, Economics of Dispersed and Incomplete Information, in METHOD, PROCESS
AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LUDWIG VON MISES 113 (Israel M. Kirzner ed.,
1982). In a similar vein, see SCHUMPETER, supra note 2.
39. RICHARDSON, supra note 33, at 39.
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V. THE ONLY GOAL OF COMPETITION POLICY: ENABLING THE SEARCH
FOR KNOWLEDGE
A restatement of competition policy, naturally, must reinstate the no-
tion of competition along the lines of market process. In this sense,
McNulty argued:
That perfect competition is an ideal state, incapable of actual realization,
is a familiar theme of economic literature. That for various reasons it
would be less than altogether desirable, even if it were attainable, is also
widely acknowledged. But that perfect competition is a state of affairs
quite incompatible with the idea of any and all competition has been in-
sufficiently emphasized. 40
Perfect competition is no competition at all, for the very simple reason
that it is a situation where all potential for exchanges has already been ex-
hausted and all profit opportunities have already been seized.
Instead of assuming that knowledge about the collective behavior of
firms is readily known to each market, I propose adopting a competition
model governed by the opposite assumption-that such knowledge is miss-
ing and, therefore, no one in the system knows how others will behave in
response to anticipated changes in future demand. This alternative vision of
competition assumes individuals would react differently to anticipated
events: individuals have differing capacities for awareness about new mar-
ket information, prejudices and beliefs condition the type and quantity of
knowledge which individuals internalize and assimilate, etc. Under this
vision, institutions play a crucial role in explaining how market exchanges
are brought about via a process whereby knowledge is conveyed to some
individuals and denied to others.41
Market competition is a dynamic phenomenon whereby alert entre-
preneurs seize unfolding profit opportunities that are constantly changing.
In this model, labor division, specialization, and differentiation take place
thanks to the creativity of entrepreneurs. However, since people are not
equally creative, it follows that not all opportunities will be available to all
entrepreneurs, as they will interpret market information about new goods,
40. Paul J. McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, in THE COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY: SELECTED READINGS 65-66 (Yale Brozen ed., 1975).
41. In this respect the institutional paradigm represented in schools of economic thought-such as
the Austrian school (begun by Menger in the last century and developed in this century by Mises,
Hayek, Lachmann, and Kirzner), the Subjectivist school (Shackle), and the post-Marshallian school
(Penrose, Richardson, Earl, and Foss)--has emphasized the need to focus on the institutional restraints
that determine trade, rather than on trade itself. Nicolai J. Foss, Austrian and Post-Marshallian Eco-
nomics: The Bridging Work of George Richardson, in ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES AND
CO-ORDINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF G. B. RICHARDSON 138-43, 149-50 (Nicolai J. Foss & Brian
J. Loasby eds., 1988).
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consumer preferences, tastes, and needs differently according to their sub-
jective perceptions. Indeed, progress is possible if only a few attentive en-
trepreneurs can spot and/or seize the profit opportunities presented by the
changing circumstances in which markets constantly evolve. Only by ena-
bling a few (as opposed to infinite) entrepreneurs to seize the opportunity
would investments take place, since a simultaneous attempt by all to seize
it would result in collective losses. Some individuals are excluded momen-
tarily from obtaining access to certain social resources, while others are
granted exclusivity.
This is the purpose of market institutions such as property rights, con-
tractual devices, arrangements, and even informal collaboration that results,
in the eyes of antitrust advocates, in "restrictive behavior." By contrast,
Schumpeter, who clearly grasped the dynamic essence of market capital-
ism, noted the role of such devices thus:
In analyzing such [restrictive] business strategy ex visu of a given point
of time, the investigating economist or government agent sees price poli-
cies that seem to him predatory and restrictions of output that seem to
him synonymous with loss of opportunities to produce. He does not see
that restrictions of this type are, in the conditions of the perennial gale,
incidents, often unavoidable incidents, of a long run process of expan-
sion which they protect rather than impede. There is no more of paradox
in this than there is in saying that motorcars are travelling [sic] faster
than they otherwise would because they are provided with brakes.42
Naturally, these devices also interrupt or block outsiders' access to
similar opportunities, but in doing so they ensure the effective exploitation
of the available opportunity. Thus, "the availability of [the] kind of infor-
mation related to competitive production depends in particular on the exis-
tence of restraints which, in varying degree, reduce the freedom of action
of individual entrepreneurs. '43
It is essential, however, that businesses are free from any other obsta-
cle to their awareness of profit opportunities. Thus, in an evolutionary mar-
ket setting, policymakers would only prohibit those restrictions that impose
a fixed course of action on or exclude third parties (such as boycotts, car-
tels set up through government legislation, legal monopolies, etc.). In this
setting, regulatory reform and the elimination of legal impediments to trade
acquire particular relevance to the policy agenda of competition authorities.
By the same token, competition authorities should abstain from intervening
when third parties are not affected, even if competitors align their conduct
42. SCHUMPETER, supra note 2, at 84.
43. RICHARDSON, supra note 33, at 69.
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with respect to prices. Richardson explains how increasing returns 44 are
compatible with dynamic competition in evolutionary settings. 45 It is not
the purpose of this article to embark on the details of this topic, but merely
to visualize how embracing this alternative theory-which calls for aban-
doning the perfect competition premise-inevitably leads to framing an
alternative agenda for competition policymakers.
Clearly, this alternative "market process" vision of competition ex-
plains the existence of those institutions that we currently find in real life
situations: property rights, contracts, arrangements, practices, routines,
business reputations, and similar other means of conveying knowledge
across the system. Far from neglecting the role of these institutions in the
market or treating them as an anomaly, the market process view of compe-
tition clearly explains their existence: these institutions are necessary for
market competition to become operational. For example, without property
rights, it would not be possible to know who has access to what social re-
sources; without exclusive supply contracts, no entrepreneur would be cer-
tain about the conduct of other entrepreneurs in connection with the
delivery of complementary inputs for her production, and therefore she
would probably not invest in such activity; and in a world without business
reputation or advertising, firms would find it extremely difficult to antici-
pate their own levels of output, given their ignorance about the likely out-
put of other firms, and so on.
Institutionally-based (or market process) competition policy would
look into the ease with which market processes evolve, unencumbered from
contrived liens and burdens, and focus on attaining optimal outcomes. Ac-
cording to O'Driscoll and Rizzo, it is only possible to do so with reference
to the processes of which those outcomes are the result: "There are not
competitive results unless there is competition .... Without competition,
there is no reference point to which comparisons with real-world results
can be made. In the absence of competitive markets, economic theory can-
not tell us what is optimal." 46 Therefore, "[c]ompetitive values or alloca-
44. In the short term, firms would tend to bear increasing production costs, thereby stimulating
decreasing returns: costs will increase together with output levels. In the long run, however, industries
usually diminish their costs, thereby increasing returns to all participating firms. Alfred Marshall termed
this finding a "law of increasing return." According to this law, long term equilibrium would bring
about lower production costs for all the firms participating in an industry-no matter the output in-
creases. I ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 318 (9th variorum ed. 1961).
45. G.B. Richardson, Competition, Innovation and Increasing Returns (DRUID Working Paper
No. 96-10, July 1996), available at http://www.druid.dk/uploads/tx-picturedb/wp96- I 0.pdf.
46. GERALD P. O'DRISCOLL, JR. & MARIO J. Rizzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE
143 (1985).
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tions do not exist 'out there,' independently ascertainable apart from actual
market results. '47
In fact, "[t]here are a few abstract distinctions that can be posited
about the outcomes of monopolistic as compared with competitive mar-
kets."'48 In a similar vein, Hayek declared: "[C]ompetition is a sensible
procedure to use only if we do not know beforehand who will do
best.... [I]t will only tell us, however, only who did best on the particular
occasion, and not necessarily that each did as well as he could have
done .... 49
Under these guidelines, competition agencies would be called to chal-
lenge any restrictions (either business- or government-created) that con-
strain market growth. As Adam Smith believed, economic progress
depends on market size; therefore, competition agencies should encourage
division of labor by lifting barriers to trade that would otherwise reduce
market size. Competition policymaking will promote dynamic competition
inasmuch it is capable of removing barriers that limit market size. In short,
competition policymaking should not attempt to devise "optimal" market
outcomes or surrogate market allocation; rather, it should direct its endeav-
ors towards eliminating obstacles that artificially reduce market size.
VI. REDEFINING THE COMPETITION POLICY AGENDA
In view of the theoretical considerations already discussed, the alter-
native, institutionally-based competition policy demands an alternative
policy agenda, as follows:
Promotion of regulatory reform and open trade as a means of opening
legal bottlenecks to competition. Competition agencies should concentrate
on eliminating official barriers to trade through deregulation and privatiza-
tion on the one hand, and trade liberalization on the other hand. This would
create the preconditions for firms to enter the market by reducing transac-
tion costs in the system. Competition agencies also should concentrate on
simplifying administrative rules so as to create a level playing field. How-
ever, the flexibility needed to adapt to market change should not be sacri-
ficed for clear principles. Competition authorities should lay down clear
principles with respect to intellectual property, to avoid deterring research
and innovative activities by inappropriately interfering with them.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 144.
49. 1HAYEK, supra note 25, at 67-68.
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Differentiating standards from trade restrictions. Competition authori-
ties should promote competition between competing networks and stan-
dards. Markets, and not governments, should determine which new features
and products should be introduced into the marketplace, which standards
should succeed, and whether open standards should achieve general accep-
tance. Consumers should not be prevented from enjoying the benefits of the
network externalities that result from the adoption of common systems and
standards, even if this results in the universal acceptance of a single prod-
uct. Competition agencies should rely on white papers and other means of
identifying voluntary business standards for each industry. These instru-
ments could enable the authorities to devise general principles of fair con-
duct, a necessary element to promote regulatory reform.
Targeting obstacles to potential third-party competitors entering the
market. These restrictions include both quasi-legal restraints on those who
would want to depart from standardized conventions, as well as corporate
rules, such as fixing the professional fees of chartered liberal professions
such as the law, medicine, and others.
Facilitating the means for settling disputes. Competition agencies
should advocate means of dispute resolution that leave the allocation of
rights in dispute to the economic agents involved in the controversy, rather
than appealing to the dictum of a government regulatory agency that is
potentially less connected with the particulars of the case in dispute. Also,
competition authorities and sectorial regulators should improve their insti-
tutional cooperation in cases where public policy considerations other than
the pursuit of innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth dictate
legal regulations (such as preservation of labor, market access to less effi-
cient competitors, and so on).
Enforcing pro-competition guidelines in privatization of public assets,
by eliminating concessions to legal monopolies during transitional periods,
or by requiring privatizing firms to fulfill strict pro-competitive conditions
such as industrial restructuring and investment targeting during transitional
stages.
In Latin America, these guidelines are seldom pursued consistently. 50
Instead, the bulk of competition agencies' work is devoted to antitrust
prosecutions, in which cumbersome measures of market power coupled
with an intuitive balancing of economic efficiencies consume most of their
50. See IGNACIO DE LEON, LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: A POLICY IN
SEARCH OF IDENTITY 161-65 (2001).
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effective time, and ultimately compromise the predictability and stability of
the rule of law.51
CONCLUSION
Conventional antitrust policy assumptions tell us that business' ma-
nipulations through contractual devices, exclusionary conduct, and "mis-
use" of property rights create market failures that are responsible for the
sub-optimal allocation of social resources. 52 From this perspective, restrict-
ing monopolistic behavior is necessary if markets are to function properly.
Instead of giving names to market arrangements, however, the question
policymaking should ask is what would happen if such restrictions were
absent altogether. This question is never answered, of course, because un-
der perfect competition models such a problem does not exist: that is, mo-
nopolistic behavior is eliminated through antitrust policies, and remaining
market participants' knowledge of each other's behavior is postulated by
the model; hence analysts are left to grapple with a problem that does not
exist in the real world.
As Richardson argues:
[B]y neglecting the whole problem of information, the perfect competi-
tion model condemns itself not only to unrealism but to inadequacy even
as a hypothetical system. It is no defence [sic] to appeal, moreover, to the
analogy of mechanical statics which, though neglecting friction, can still
identify the equilibrium position of a system of forces, for we cannot
demonstrate that economic systems have such positions of rest without
reference to expectations and information which could not be presumed
to be available in the absence of restraints.53
The conventional antitrust perspective imposes a contrived view of
market function that entirely disregards a fundamental problem: firms do
not operate in an institutional vacuum; on the contrary, in order to maxi-
mize their profits they must take into account other market players' deci-
sions. The coordination of knowledge among market players is thus the key
economic problem in search of policy solutions.
This is a problem that requires an alternative understanding of the
economic problems faced by entrepreneurs. Addleson states: "[T]he econo-
51. Judging the success of a policy on the basis of its capacity to achieve its goals creates prob-
lems because, as Rizzo reminds us, "[a] utilitarian or balancing framework would require us to trace the
full effects of each (tentative) judicial decision, and then evaluate it against the particular utilitarian
standard adopted," which places an unbearable burden of information on the shoulders of whoever must
decide the success of a policy. Mario J. Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law,
4 CATO J. 865, 873 (1985).
52. See Demsetz, supra note 22.
53. RICHARDSON, supra note 33, at 69.
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mists' meaning[] of competition requires a taxonomy, not a definition; and
a taxonomy needs a framework. '54 Wubben is even more assertive when
contending that what is needed is a new epistemology. 55 If criticizing anti-
trust policy must begin at the epistemological level, where the relevant
questions are determined and the premises of the analysis are laid down, it
is necessary to define an alternative paradigm in order to understand market
phenomena and competition.
Competition policy has to adopt an alternative perception of the way
in which the market functions, where the knowledge coordination problem
becomes central. In this alternative paradigm, one has to look into eco-
nomic institutions shaping market transactions before condemning them as
"anticompetitive," "monopolistic," and so forth. Competition analysis must
be enriched with comparative institutional analysis, economic history, and
other social sciences in order to gain effectiveness. Exploring the role of
culture in competition policy development immediately raises important
issues of law and economics that are far from settled. Given its broader
perspective, institutional analysis overcomes the constraints of the legal
wording of a competition statute that holds competition policy (understood
as the development of entrepreneurial ways and promotion of creative in-
novation) in a very tight grip. Such reliance has driven policy makers away
from a more complete understanding of those issues that explain the fun-
damental role played by institutions.
It follows from the foregoing that the substratum of economic institu-
tions such as culture, learned habits, and ethical values play a fundamental
role in shaping competition policymaking. To shape competition policy
appropriately one must take into consideration the institutional develop-
ment of the society, which will allow one to evaluate any potential restric-
tions on competition that may exist in the form of government policies.
An institutional perspective of competition policy grounds the analysis
in the social rules where the policy is actually enforced. Acknowledging
this fact reveals several crucial points. First, competition policy, like any
human endeavor, is grounded in ideology and normative values, not hard
science. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, provided analysts are aware
of the nature of the ethical debate entertained by competition policy au-
thorities. In this way, the necessary institutional constraints will be insti-
tuted to prevent competition policy from becoming unbridled or
54. Mark Addleson, Competition, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 97 (Peter
J. Boettke ed., 1994).
55. Emiel Wubben, Austrian Economics and Uncertainty: On a Non-Deterministic but Non-
Haphazard Future, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 106-07 (Gerrit Meijer ed., 1995).
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uncontrolled. Indeed, such constraints are essential to reinforcing the rule
of law, predictability of the policy, and transparency of market rules.
Second, the fact that normative standards are ultimately ethical does
not necessarily undermine the conclusions drawn from an understanding of
market dynamics. For this reason, rather than judging entrepreneurial be-
havior from a normative standpoint, competition analysts should concen-
trate on making surrounding institutions more transparent and open to
entrepreneurs, so as to draw tentative guidelines about the best possible
way to promote market exchanges. By doing away with imaginary con-
structions of contrived social welfare, and closely inspecting and looking at
past business experience, the market exchanges have a greater opportunity
to reach their utmost potential.
Third, competition authorities should avoid falling into the intellectual
trap of endorsing contrived social welfare standards that essentially contra-
dict market competition. Developing and transitioning countries should be
particularly careful to remember that the ultimate goal of competition must
be connected to the development of competitiveness, innovation, and eco-
nomic development.
Fourth, culture is a fundamental factor that policymakers must take
into account at the time of a competition policy's development. A central
planning tradition perpetuates ways of conceiving policymaking that may
run contrary to the logic of introducing markets, thereby making the initial
work of competition authorities particularly cumbersome. It is necessary to
give them the right tools to devise alternative policy solutions to govern-
ment interference in the markets.
These fundamental reasons suggest that the competition authorities'
policy agenda should address regulatory reform and exercise strong "com-
petition advocacy," thereby challenging government regulations and rules
that inhibit innovation and business development. Based on the experience
of Latin America and other countries outside the region, this should be-
come a central concern of policymaking for competition authorities. It is
essential that professional, independent, and highly motivated officials
enforce competition policy. In addition, proper rules should be instituted to
ensure that decisions are balanced, carefully drafted, quickly enforced, and
above all, always controlled by a well-trained judiciary.
The conventional competition policymaking usually applied in devel-
oped countries has suffered evident mutation in the anti-market institutional
constraints of Latin American societies; hence, optimal design of competi-
tion policy must be crafted to overcome the particular anti-capitalist bias
prevailing in the region's economic culture. Instead of blaming the poor
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market performance and low competitive levels of Latin American firms on
the high industrial concentration that prevails among Latin America's do-
mestic markets, competition agencies would fare better if they went one
step further and asked themselves about the causes of such concentration.
They probably will not find the "invisible hand" of markets which, if any-
thing, has been absent from the region, dominated as it is by mercantilist
trade policies and high government dirigisme. More likely, they will find
the "visible hand" of governments behind such concentration. Godek has
put it very simply: "Worrying about antitrust issues shows an unhealthy
anxiety about the imagined ills of capitalism. '5 6
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